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On ‘the natural nature of naturalism’: Answers to John Hedley Brooke’s questions 
 
Abstract 
In John Hedley Brooke’s response to my 2018 Boyle Lecture he provided some helpful 
prompts to sharpen my position on naturalism, and posed two further questions to me. This 
article takes up his prompts, and offers some answers to his questions, especially concerning 
the resurrection of Jesus.  
 
Keywords: Miracle, divine action, resurrection, naturalistic explanation, naturalism, natural 
sciences, hermeneutics, New Testament, Paul, Gospels 
 
 
In borrowing John Hedley Brooke’s (2018) resonant phrase, ‘the natural nature of naturalism’ 
for my title, I aim to return his compliment in responding to my Boyle Lecture; he has 
sharpened my focus, and posed two questions to me. Like Fretheim’s term ‘hypernature’ 
which I use in my Boyle Lecture (Harris 2018), Brooke’s phrase helps to elucidate some of 
the elusive qualities of naturalism for further theological reflection. I am therefore 
enormously grateful for his comments, and for the opportunity he has given me to develop 
further my thoughts on science and the interpretation of biblical miracle and apocalypse 
stories. 
 
Conventional talk of naturalism today often serves to close down theological approaches to 
nature rather than allow them to flourish, by assuming that Hume’s definition of miracle 
holds whereby there can be no divine activity in the normal course of nature. Hence, 
naturalistic interpretations of the Bible’s stories of miracle and apocalypse are often taken as 
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being deflationary towards theology, ‘explaining away’ miracle claims rather than providing 
creative means of reflecting upon them within a scientific worldview. My Boyle Lecture tries 
to suggest a more subtle picture, where naturalistic explanations can even lend themselves to 
a natural theology of the Bible’s stories of miracle and apocalypse.  
 
As Brooke points out in his response, the natural science of past centuries was read by its 
practitioners in a variety of theistic and non-theistic ways when the question of divine 
causation was in view. Some saw a naturalistic explanation of a phenomenon or a miracle 
story as excluding divine intervention, while others took it as confirmation. As Brooke (2018) 
put it so memorably, ‘during its fascinating history there has been no “natural” nature of 
naturalism. It has existed in a variety of theistic and non-theistic forms.’ Another way of 
saying this, I suggest, is that there is no sharp or uncontested boundary between naturalism 
and natural theology: not only do they overlap, but there is a sense in which they can become 
the very same thing, depending upon how one construes the metaphysical foundations of the 
natural sciences. For this very reason, I find contemporary theological attempts to demarcate 
a self-consciously ‘theistic naturalism’ (or even ‘naturalistic theism’) unconvincing: the 
standard-issue naturalism of the natural sciences can be magnificently theistic of its own 
accord if one is so disposed, without any need to add extra theological bells and whistles. In 
the same way, I cannot join with those theists who warn against naturalism (even 
methodological naturalism) as though it is virtual atheism (Plantinga 2011; Torrance 2017). 
This, to me, misunderstands the activity of the natural sciences and their history. Again, as 
Brooke has said: there is no natural nature of naturalism.  
 
But Brooke makes this point perfectly in his own historical way, and my own contemporary 
theistic gloss here acts simply to underscore the point even further. Hence, I wouldn’t 
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normally consider responding to such a helpful response as Brooke’s, if it weren’t for the fact 
that he has posed two questions to me.  
 
Brooke’s first question concerns the naturalistic assumptions of critical biblical scholarship. 
In setting biblical scholars up as the uniformitarians to the catastrophism of the natural 
scientists who write on biblical miracles, I have suggested that the former group have a 
methodological naturalism of their own which relies on the uniformity of human myth-
making and story telling throughout all ages. If this is so, then ‘how do biblical scholars 
decide whether their historical trajectories for the content of biblical texts are destructive or 
affirmative of faith’, Brooke asks. My answer is that it depends on whose faith is at issue. If 
we’re talking about the faith of those distant people of the Ancient Near East who first 
recounted the stories and traditions that we possess in the Bible, and who eventually 
preserved them in writing for us, then biblical scholars are intensely concerned to investigate, 
to understand, and to preserve the details of those historical people’s faith as accurately as 
possible, in the form of modern historiographical accounts of ancient theology. But if we’re 
talking about the living faith of modern-day Bible readers (including the biblical scholars 
themselves), then the question of destruction or affirmation is (in principle) quite irrelevant to 
the historical exercise. Biblical scholars working in the historical-critical paradigm are 
required to ‘check their faith at the door’ in pursuit of the best historiography. This means 
that, when Brooke asks the second part of this question, concerning what predispositions 
come into play concerning transcendence and revelation in the miracle stories, my answer to 
this (again) depends very much on whose predispositions are under the microscope: ancient 
or modern people? In practice, of course, one notices that a modern scholar’s faith 
predispositions can indeed influence their historiography (despite protestations to the 
contrary); the long-running debate on the historical Moses is a good example. While biblical 
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scholars with conservative Christian or Jewish pedigrees often maintain that there is a basic 
historicity surrounding Moses, few others are concerned. 
 
In Brooke’s second question, faith predispositions come even more to the fore. Noticing the 
crucial ‘almost’ in my assertion that ‘there’s almost nothing in the Bible that the sciences 
can’t explain’, he asks astutely whether the resurrection of Jesus succumbs to a scientific 
approach, or is so sacrosanct to a Christian that she would prefer to maintain its impossibility 
by ringfencing it from naturalistic incursions. In tiresome academic fashion, my answer is 
neither yes nor no, since I don’t see the issues surrounding the resurrection in either/or terms. 
This is a complex area (which is why I didn’t touch on it in my Boyle Lecture), and at least 
four factors need to be weighed up. 
 
First, whatever other areas of thought we may bring to bear in addressing Brooke’s question, 
I would regard it as first and foremost a matter of interpretation of the primary evidence of 
the resurrection at our disposal, namely the New Testament. But no New Testament passage 
attempts to describe what happened in the resurrection of Jesus; as an event in time and space 
it is shrouded in mystery. Instead, what we tend to find are thoroughly theological statements, 
such as ‘God raised him from the dead’ (Acts 13:30; Rom.10:9), which make no attempt to 
describe what happened in naturalistic terms, nor even to help us understand precisely what 
‘raised him’ might mean. The closest we come to a discussion of what the resurrection entails 
is Paul’s riposte to those Corinthian Christians who claimed that ‘there is no resurrection of 
the dead’ (1 Cor.15:12). We don’t know precisely what the Corinthians were arguing beyond 
this statement, but Paul’s response makes it clear that he does indeed believe in the 
resurrection of the dead, since Christ is its ‘firstfruits’ (v.20). Moreover, the risen Jesus is 
visible, since Paul mentions witnesses (vv.5-8), and yet the resurrection body is not entirely 
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like our own: it is both bodily and ‘spiritual’ (pneumatikon; v.44); it is imperishable and 
immortal (vv.52-4); our present bodies, in relation to the resurrection body, are like seeds 
which must be sown before their full potential is revealed (vv.35-8); but this is ultimately all 
‘a mystery’ (v.51). From that point of view, Brooke’s question whether the resurrection is so 
sacrosanct that it is beyond science could be answered in the affirmative, although my 
reading of the New Testament suggests a nuance here: it’s not because the resurrection is 
sacrosanct that we are unable to describe it in naturalistic terms, but because it’s a profound 
secret.  
 
Second, when it comes to interpreting the witness reports contained in the New Testament, 
there has been controversy since the earliest days, including over attempts to introduce 
naturalistic explanations of the evidence. The empty tomb story in the Four Gospels has been 
(and remains) a particular target for those who wish to ‘explain away’ the resurrection story 
naturalistically. Matthew’s Gospel records an early example. After Jesus is raised, the guards 
at the tomb report to the chief priests, who charge the guards with maintaining that Jesus’ 
disciples came and stole the body away while the guards were asleep (Matt.28:11-15). Now 
Matthew clearly includes this detail precisely because it’s a matter of debate in his own day, 
some decades later (‘And this story is told among the Jews to this day’; v.15). And clearly, 
Matthew hopes to discredit this naturalistic interpretation, by recounting the empty tomb 
story from Mark’s earlier Gospel with some significant additions. In particular, Matthew goes 
considerably further than Mark in overegging the apocalyptic and stupendous happenings 
around the resurrection of Jesus, all presumably with the aim of demonstrating that something 
quite otherworldly and unique has happened to Jesus, to the extent that he is alive again in 
bodily form. There are earthquakes (Matt.27:51; 28:2), an angel who descends from heaven 
(28:2), the bodily resurrection of many of the ‘saints’ in the tombs who go about appearing to 
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the people of Jerusalem (27:52-53), and the visible appearance of Jesus alive in bodily form 
to the women (28:9-10) and to the eleven disciples (28:16-20). Hence, Matthew’s version of 
the story draws explicit parallels with the traditions of Jewish apocalyptic, in order to provide 
confirmation for his Jewish readers that what happened to Jesus is fully in accord with Jewish 
expectations, which includes the bodily resurrection of the dead. 
 
A rather different controversy appears to be reflected in Luke’s and John’s accounts of the 
risen Jesus, although both evangelists emphasise the tangible physicality of Jesus’ 
resurrection body. For example, ‘Touch me and see;’ says the risen Jesus to his disciples in 
Luke, ‘for a ghost does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have’ (Luke 24:39). It’s 
often supposed that Luke is reacting here to a docetic interpretation of the resurrection in his 
own day (perhaps related to that which Ignatius of Antioch challenged in the early second 
century), where the risen Jesus is said to be a spiritual apparition, like a ghost. Luke goes to 
some lengths to insist that, although the risen Jesus could appear and disappear at will (e.g. 
Luke 24:31), yet he was bodily like any other living human, not a ghost. Luke’s Jesus can 
interact and engage with other humans in an entirely natural and personal way: he can be 
touched, he can eat, and when he departs to heaven, he ascends in bodily form within Luke’s 
cosmology (Luke 24:50-51). Indeed, the ascension is the pivot on which Luke’s two-volume 
work (Luke-Acts) turns, and so it’s in Luke’s theological interests to emphasise the bodily 
reality of the risen Jesus against any docetising tendencies. (And it is interesting to note that 
something like the docetic/ghost interpretation remains widespread today among many 
Christians, who also prefer to emphasise the spiritual dimension of resurrection over its 
potential bodiliness. Of course, claiming that the risen Jesus is primarily a spiritual entity (a 
‘ghost’) is no more scientific/naturalistic than affirming his bodily resurrection, but the ghost 
interpretation does have the advantage that it fits more neatly into the abiding substance 
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dualism of many modern Christians, who believe that their entirely-spiritual souls will go to 
an entirely-spiritual heaven when they die).  
 
The point I am trying to make is that the idea of resurrection – whether of all the dead or just 
of Jesus – has never been uncontroversial, even among Christians, and that these 
controversies are even built into the primary evidence, namely the New Testament texts. In 
other words, we have no neutral access to the event of resurrection; our accounts – whether 
by Paul or by the Gospel writers – already show plentiful signs that they are promoting their 
own theological interpretations against others.  
 
To summarise this second point then, just as I suggested in my Boyle Lecture concerning the 
sea crossing text of Exodus, the resurrection texts of the New Testament don’t provide us 
with ‘value-free’ evidence. The texts already contain theological interpretation, re-
interpretation, and evaluation of later controversies which are built into the very story itself. 
In other words, Brooke’s question about the scientific impossibility of the event of 
resurrection presupposes that we know what it means to speak in metaphysical terms about 
the reality of the event. Instead, I suggest that the reality we need to wrestle with is that of the 
texts: the question is more hermeneutical and epistemological than it is metaphysical.  
 
Third, there are important perspectives to bring to bear from the contemporary science-and-
religion dialogue. In the previous paragraphs I went into the issues surrounding interpretation 
of the New Testament resurrection texts at some length, because I suspect that these will be 
less familiar to Zygon readers. More familiar, I imagine, will be those contemporary 
treatments of the resurrection of Jesus by science-and-religion scholars John Polkinghorne 
(2002), David Wilkinson (2010), R. J. Russell (2008; 2012), and Frank Tipler (2007). I will 
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therefore be brief here, but the point I want to make is that these scholars present a third 
factor to account for in answering Brooke’s question. While none of them seeks to ‘explain 
away’ the resurrection stories, nor to suggest a biological mechanism that might bring a dead 
man’s body back to life, yet all three affirm the bodily resurrection of Jesus in naturalistic 
terms by exploring its eschatological implications through the lenses of modern physics and 
cosmology. In other words, none of these scholars regards the resurrection as so sacrosanct 
that modern science might not have something useful to say.  
 
Fourth, this brings me to the final factor to bear in mind when answering Brooke’s question 
about the supposed scientific impossibility of the resurrection of Jesus, namely the question’s 
implicit assumption that the resurrection is a Humean miracle which breaks a law of nature, 
and is therefore literally ‘impossible’ in naturalistic terms. Following Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
R. J. Russell (2008; 2012) has explored the intriguing possibility that, while the resurrection 
may be impossible according to our current laws of nature, yet in the new creation there will 
be a law of nature so that all of the dead will be raised. The resurrection of Jesus is a 
completely unique occurrence (in this world) of something that will be universal in the next; 
it is the ‘first instantiation of a new law of nature’ (FINLON, in Russell’s parlance). Now 
while the resurrection of Jesus is, on this account, something like a Humean miracle in our 
world, it most definitely isn’t in the world to come. Appearances of the risen Jesus effectively 
occur in a bubble of new creation which is visible from our creation. While I am personally 
not-entirely convinced by this model (Harris 2014a), it does indirectly affirm a major strand 
of theological thought in the New Testament concerning resurrection, namely that the 
resurrection of Jesus is a new creation, and a sign of such. In other words, the resurrection of 
Jesus might appear to possess the characteristics of a Humean miracle, yet in New Testament 
theological terms it’s an act of creation. And if the resurrection is an act of creation, then the 
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scientific question of whether or not it’s a naturalistic impossibility becomes less relevant 
compared with its theological import.  
 
To bring this rather lengthy reply to Brooke’s question on the resurrection of Jesus to a close, 
I have raised four factors which, I believe, need to be weighed up before taking a view on the 
scientific impossibility of the resurrection, or the degree to which its sacrosanct nature (for 
Christians) takes it beyond reach. I have suggested that this is still (after two thousand years) 
an open question for many, not least because the nature of resurrection is shrouded from 
view, quite deliberately on the part of its key player (God), if the New Testament witness is 
to be believed (‘God raised Jesus’). The New Testament witness is – as I hope I’ve made 
clear – not unambiguous in these matters itself, and there remains much still to be done in 
developing an appropriate hermeneutic from the perspective of the science-and-religion field. 
This should be an important concern for the field’s engagement with Christian belief, I feel, 
since it’s in questions surrounding the incarnation of Christ – which include his resurrection 
and ascension (Harris 2014b) – that the interest of the science-and-religion field in this-
worldly and other-worldly realities meet their sharpest point of focus. Hence (and this is my 
final answer to Brooke), far from wanting to foreclose on questions around the 
scientific/sacrosanct nature of resurrection, I suggest that it’s essential they remain open, and 
remain in circulation.  
 
But once again, I wish to thank John warmly for his razor-sharp comments and questions, 
which have taken me way beyond the content of my Boyle Lecture to some of the most 
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